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CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS (MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS) FOR COMPANIES IN EU


a.      Merger control
i.           Introduction

Based on a system of prior notification, Regulation 139/2004 is rather intended to prevent future concentrations from significantly impeding effective competition in the EU. This has important procedural consequences which in many respects distinguish control of concentrations from infringement proceedings under Regulation 1/2003.



ii.         Notification of concentrations ‘having a Community dimension’

The compulsory one-stop shop monitoring system which Regulation 139/2004 sets up concerns exclusively concentrations having a Community dimension, that is to say concentrations entailing significant structural changes, the impact of which on the market goes beyond the national borders of any one Member State. This is because EU powers can be exercised only within the limits of the principle of subsidiarity.

Article 1 of Regulation 139/2004 sets the thresholds for considering that a merger has a Community dimension and is therefore subject to the requirement of a prior notification under Article 4(1). Pursuant to the latter provision, concentrations (i.e. mergers or acquisitions) with a Community dimension are to be notified to the Commission prior to their implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest. A concentration which consists of a merger within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) or in the acquisition of joint control within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation 139/2004 have to be notified jointly by the parties to the merger or by those acquiring joint control. Failure to notify a concentration of a Community dimension, either intentionally or negligently, potentially has serious consequences for the undertaking(s) concerned. The Commission may impose on them fines not exceeding 10% of their aggregate turnover in the preceding year.

iii.       Standard merger control procedure

Anticipating the impact which a concentration is liable to have on competition is a very complex task requiring in particular full cooperation of the undertakings involved and the possibility for third-parties to make know their views on the ensuing market restructuring. The Commission is presumably better placed to verify that a planned concentration will not significantly impede effective competition if it has been informed on the state of the market and its likely evolution by market actors other than the notifying party(-ies). The procedure of control set out in Regulation 139/2004 reflects those requirements.

Provided a notified concentration falls within the scope of Regulation 139/2004, the Commission publishes the fact of the notification and indicates at the same time the names of the undertakings concerned, their country of origin, the nature of the concentration and the economic sectors involved. That publication should however take into account the legitimate interests of the undertakings concerned in protecting their business secrets. The Commission explicitly acknowledges that the notifying parties and the parties to a proposed concentration discuss the intended concentration informally and in strict confidence before notification. The information which is to be notified to the Commission is specified in Annexes to Implementing Regulation 802/2004.

It is necessary to limit as much as possible the period of legal uncertainty between notification and the date on which the Commission adopts final position on it. Accordingly, the Commission has to examine the notification as soon as it is received. Where it concludes that the concentration notified does not fall within the scope of the regulation, it records that finding by means of a decision. If it finds that the concentration does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market, it decides not to oppose it and declares that it is compatible with the common market. If the Commission takes the view, on the contrary, that the concentration notified falls within the scope of the regulation and raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market, it decides to initiate proceedings. Those decisions have to be taken within 25 working days at most, that period starting on the working day following that of the receipt of the notification.

The Commission may also, by decision notified without delay to the undertakings concerned and the competent authorities of the other Member States, refer a notified concentration to the competent authorities of the Member State concerned if the concentration threatens to affect significantly competition in a market within that member State, which presents all characteristic of a distinct market, or if a concentration affects competition in a market within that Member State, which presents all the characteristics of a distinct market and which does not constitute a substantial part of the common market.

The Commission is entitled to request from the notifying parties and more generally other undertakings or associations of undertakings all information which it deems necessary to conduct its investigation. The Commission fixes the time limit within which the information is to be provided. It may also conduct all necessary inspections of undertakings and associations of undertakings, which involves in particular the right to enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings and associations of undertakings, to examine the books and other records related to the business, irrespective of the medium on which they are stored, or to seal any business premises and books or records for the period and to the extent necessary for the inspection.

Fines of up to 1% of the aggregate turnover for the preceding business year may be imposed by the Commission on undertakings or associations of undertakings which, negligently or intentionally, supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information to the Commission or if seals have been broken.

In accordance with the principle of respect for the rights of defence, the notifying parties must be given the opportunity to submit their comments on all the objections which the Commission proposes to take into account in its decisions. Before adopting (inter alia) a decision authorising a concentration subject to certain modifications by the parties concerned and/or subject to certain conditions (Article 8(2) of Regulation 139/2004), or a decision declaring that a concentration is incompatible with the common market (Article 8(3) of Regulation 139/2004), the Commission is thus under a duty to give the persons, undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned the opportunity of making known their views on the objections against them. In so far as the Commission or the competent authorities of the Member States deem it necessary, they may also hear other natural or legal persons. Third persons, including customers, suppliers, associations of consumers and competitors, are also entitled to be heard upon application, provided they show a sufficient interest.

In that context, the Commission informs the notifying parties and other involved parties (that is, parties to the proposed concentration other than the notifying parties, such as the seller and the undertaking which is the target of the concentration) of its objections and sets a time limit within which they may make known their views in writing. In their written submissions, the notifying parties may request a hearing in order to develop their arguments. In that case, the Commission has to hold one.

If third parties apply in writing to be heard, the Commission informs them in writing of the nature and subject-matter of the procedure and sets a time limit within which they make known their views. The Commission may (upon request or not) invite those parties to participate in a formal hearing or to express their views orally.

iv.       Simplified merger control procedure

The compulsory system of notification under Regulation 139/2004 constitutes an efficient safety net preventing large mergers and acquisitions from significantly impeding effective competition. Although it is limited to concentrations with a Community dimension, that system represents considerable workload for the Commission. Search for efficiency has led the Commission to set up a simplified procedure enabling it to adopt a short-form decision declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market. 

Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under Council Regulation 139/2004  applies inter alia to the following categories of concentrations:

·        - two or more undertakings acquire joint control of a joint venture, provided that the joint venture has no, or negligible, actual or foreseen activities in the territory of the European Economic Area (that is to say where the turnover of the joint venture of the contributed activities is less than EUR 100 million in the EEA territory at the time of notification, and the total value of assets transferred to the joint venture is less than EUR 100 million in the EEA territory at the time of notification ;

·        - two  or more undertakings merge, or one or more undertakings acquire sole or joint control of another undertaking, provided that none of the parties to the concentration are engaged in business activities in the same product and geographic market, or in a product market which is upstream or downstream from a product market in which any other to the concentration is engaged;

·        - a party is to acquire sole control of an undertaking over which it already has joint control.

The Notice on a simplified concentration control procedure recognizes how valuable pre-notification contacts with the Commission can be with a view to identifying unproblematic cases and hence the information which has to be submitted with the formal notification.

If, upon receipt of a notification, the Commission takes provisionally the view that the concentration may qualify for a simplified procedure, that information is published (together with standard information) in the Official Journal of the European Union. Interested parties thus have the opportunity to submit why they consider that the concentration in issue requires a full investigation.

If the Commission takes the view that the notified concentration fulfills all conditions for the simplified procedure (including where the notifying parties did not request it), it issues a short-form decision declaring the concentration compatible with the internal market. That decision is adopted within 25 working days from the date of notification.  The Commission may however at any time before adopting such a decision, where appropriate, take the view that it is necessary to revert to a full assessment under the normal merger procedure.

v.         Access to the file and confidentiality issues

a.      Principles

Implementing Regulation 802/2004 distinguishes between categories of interested parties regarding access to the file.

Concerning first the notifying parties, the Commission has to grant them full access to the file after notifying the statement of objections. The Commission, upon request, must also grant other involved parties who have been informed of the objections access to the file, but only in so far as this is necessary for the purposes of preparing their comments. In each case, access is granted only to the non-confidential version of the file, which does not include business secrets or other confidential information the disclosure of which is not considered necessary by the Commission for the purpose of the procedure.

All persons which make known their views in the course of the proceedings are invited to ‘clearly identify any material which [they] consider[…] to be confidential, giving reasons, and provide a separate non-confidential version by the date set by the Commission’. The Commission may also, on its own initiative, require from the parties involved in the proceedings that they identify the documents or parts of documents which they consider to contain business secrets or other confidential information, or to identify any part of a statement of objections, case summary or a decision which in their view contains business secrets.

By contrast, third parties (even when they have been authorized to submit their views) are not granted access to the Commission’s file.    

Just like access to the Commission’s files in cartel and antitrust proceedings, rules on access to Commission’s files in merger proceedings are set out in the Notice on access to the file. The notifying parties are to be granted access to the file upon request at every stage of the procedure following the notification of the Commission’s objections (and up to the consultation of the Advisory Committee). The qualification of a piece of information as confidential is not a bar to its disclosure if such information is considered necessary by the Commission for the purpose of the procedure.

b.      Interaction with the Regulation on access to documents

Case C-404/10 P, Commission v. Éditions Odile Jacob [2012] clarifies how the provisions on access to the file in Implementing Regulation 802/2004 interact with the Regulation on access to documents. That dispute had it roots in a challenge by Éditions Odile Jacob of a Commission decision declaring the concentration between Lagardère, Natexis and VUP compatible with the internal market. As a third party to the concentration, Éditions Odile Jacob had no right of access to the Commission’s file during the administrative proceedings. In order to substantiate its judicial challenge of the Commission’s decision before the General Court, however, that undertaking lodged a request to the Commission on the basis of the Regulation on access to documents, seeking access to, in particular the Commission’s decision to initiate an in-depth merger investigation, the full text of the sale and purchase agreement signed by the parties to the merger in issue, and correspondence between the Commission and those parties. The Commission refused to grant that access. Overruling a judgment of the General Court, the Court took the view that, although the Regulation on access to documents is designed to confer on the public as wide a right of access as possible to documents of the institutions, there is a good reason for not granting such access pursuant to Article 4 of that Regulation where granting access would undermine the specific system of access to the Commission’s file put in place by Regulation 139/2004. As the Court stated:

‘…generalized access, on the basis of [the Regulation on access to documents], to the documents exchanged in [a merger control procedure] between the Commission and the notifying parties or third parties would…jeopardise the balance which the European Union legislature sought to ensure in [Regulation 139/2004] between the obligation of the undertakings concerned to send the Commission possibly sensitive commercial information to enable it to assess the compatibility of the proposed transaction with the common market, on the one hand, and the guarantee of increased protection, by virtue of the requirement of professional secrecy and business secrecy, for the information so provided to the Commission, on the other.’

Consequently, when interpreting the exceptions to the right of access under Article 4(2) of the Regulation on access to documents (that is, protecting commercial interests of a natural or legal person and protecting the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits), a general presumption should be acknowledged that disclosure of documents exchanged between the Commission and undertakings during merger control proceedings undermines, in principle, both protection of the objectives of investigation activities and that of the commercial interests of the undertakings involved in such a procedure’. In the context of merger control, those principles apply irrespective of whether the procedure is still pending or is already closed.

That however does not exclude the possibility of demonstrating that a given document disclosure of which has been requested is not covered by that presumption, or that there is a higher public interest justifying the disclosure of the document concerned. Until the Commission’s decision on the merger is definitive, there is also a presumption that disclosing internal memoranda or legal advice would seriously undermine that institution’s decision-making process.

Following that judgment, the question arose whether the Court’s reasoning concerning the existence of presumptions was also applicable in the context of proceedings under Regulation 1/2003. As stated above, on the one hand, the context here is very different not only because the proceedings do not result from a voluntary notification and they have as their subject-matter a possible violation of Article 101 or 102 TFEU. On the other hand, Regulation 1/2003 and Implementing Regulation 773/2004 provide for specific rules protecting business secrets and other confidential information in the Commission’s file. One month before the judgment in Commission v. Éditions Odile Jacob was delivered, the General Court delivered its judgment in Case T-344/08, Energie Baden-Württemberg (EnBW) v. Commission [2012]. In these proceedings, a German energy-distribution company which considered itself to be the victim of a cartel censured by a Commission’s decision sought access to various documents in the file which had led to the adoption of that decision. EnBW submitted that that information would be useful to substantiate a future claim for damages before national courts. The request for access covered in particular leniency documents, requests for information and the parties’ replies to those questions, documents obtained during inspections, the statement of objections and the parties’ replies thereto, as well as internal Commission documents. In the Commission’s view, all these documents fell within the exception provided for in the third indent of Article 4(2) of the Regulation on access to documents (protecting the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits). Several of them were covered by the exception in the first indent (protecting commercial interests). In annulment proceedings initiated against that decision, the General Court took the view that the Commission was not entitled to presume, without undertaking a specific analysis of each document, that all the documents requested were clearly covered by the exception concerning protection of the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits. The presumption was available only for documents obtained during inspections. In its appeal against that decision, the Commission argued in essence that the General Court’s approach, granting broad access to files in cartel or abuse of dominance files, entailed the risk of undermining the special rules governing access to it set out in Regulation 1/2003 and Implementing Regulation 773/2004. Moreover, interpreting the exception under the third indent of Article 4(2) of the Regulation on access to documents is liable not only to jeopardise the purpose of investigations in each particular case but also the effective application of EU competition law in general.



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